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Abstract. The employment of  s u per c ond u c ti ng  ma g nets ,  i n the hi g h ener g i es  c olli d er s ,  opens  
c ha lleng i ng  f a i lu r e s c ena r i os  a nd  b r i ng s  new  c r i ti c a li ti es  f or  the w hole s ys tem pr otec ti on. F or  the 
L H C  b ea m los s  pr otec ti on s ys tem,  the f a i lu r e r a te a nd  the a v a i la b i li ty r eq u i r ements  ha v e b een 
ev a lu a ted  u s i ng  the Sa f ety Integ r i ty L ev el ( SIL )  a ppr oa c h. A  d ow nti me c os t ev a lu a ti on i s  u s ed  
a s  i npu t f or  the SIL  a ppr oa c h. The mos t c r i ti c a l s ys tems ,  w hi c h c ontr i b u te to the f i na l SIL  v a lu e,  
a r e the d u mp s ys tem,  the i nter loc k  s ys tem,  the b ea m los s  moni tor s  s ys tem a nd  the ener g y 
moni tor  s ys tem. The B ea m L os s  M oni tor s  Sys tem ( B L M S)  i s  c r i ti c a l f or  s hor t a nd  i ntens e 
pa r ti c les  los s es ,  w hi le a t med i u m a nd  hi g her  los s  ti me i t i s  a s s i s ted  b y other  s ys tems ,  s u c h a s  the 
q u enc h pr otec ti on s ys tem a nd  the c r yog eni c  s ys tem. F or  B L M S,  ha r d w a r e a nd  s of tw a r e ha v e 
b een ev a lu a ted  i n d eta i l. The r eli a b i li ty i npu t f i g u r es  ha v e b een c ollec ted  u s i ng  hi s tor i c a l d a ta  
f r om the SP S,  u s i ng  temper a tu r e a nd  r a d i a ti on d a ma g e ex per i menta l d a ta  a s  w ell a s  u s i ng  
s ta nd a r d  d a ta b a s es . A ll the d a ta  ha s  b een pr oc es s ed  b y a  r eli a b i li ty s of tw a r e ( Is og r a ph) . The 
a na lys i s  r a ng es  f r om the c omponents  d a ta  to the s ys tem c onf i g u r a ti on. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Large Hadron Collider (LHC) is the next CERN particle accelerator that will 
try  to penetrate f urther into the m atter structure, accelerating protons up to 7  TeV . The 
innov ativ e characteristic is the wide scale use of  superconducting m agnets to reach 
f ields closed to 9  Tesla so as to b end the high energy  particles b eam . The 
superconducting technology  inv olv es dif f erent challenges, m ainly  addressed to 
generate and m aintain the m agnets in the superconductiv e state. O ne of  the critical 
applications is the Machine Protection S y stem , which intends to av oid m achine 
dam ages caused b y  the heating f ollowing a b eam  loss. 
In this work  we will introduce the general LHC approach to prev ent these ev ents 
with the utiliz ation of  dif f erent sy stem s. Later we will f ocus on the B eam  Loss 
Monitors S y stem , analy z ing the design aspects and the dependab ility  f igures.  
S IL  A P P ROA CH  
In this paragraph we will discuss the possib ility  to use the S af ety  Integrity  Lev els 
(S IL) approach f or the m achine protection purpose. In f act, strictly  speak ing, the 
standard IEC 61 50 8 [1 ] is used as guideline f or the personal saf ety  and not f or the 
m achine protection. In any  case, it giv es general f igures and hints that could wisely  
used to protect m achine rather than people. 
The aim  of  the S IL is to suggest f ailure rate f igures to f ace a risk  occurrence. In the 
f ollowing we will def ine the risk  concept and we describ e the procedure used to 
extract the reliab ility  f igures f or the sy stem . 
RIS K S  F OR L H C B E A M  L OS S E S  
G enerally  speak ing, we can def ine the risk   associate to an ev ent as a product of  the 
prob ab ility   that this ev ent will happen m ultiplied b y  a general cost  of  that 
conseq uence, which is “how of ten we pay  som ething”. 
The S IL standard sim ply  giv es a way  to estim ate and to f ix that prob ab ility  to 
m inim iz e the risk  to pay  a cost. 
In f act, the prob ab ility  P is strongly  connected to the sy stem  designed to m inim iz e 
the risk  of  the outcom e: its range runs f rom  the ev ent f req uency  F, when there is no 
protection sy stem , down to a lev el def ined b y  the sy stem  f unctionality . 
In the f ollowing we will extract f rom  the S IL standard the f igures f or a saf e 
operation (the sy stem  work s when it has to work ) and f or an ef f icient one (the sy stem  
does not work  when it does not hav e to work ). 
The two m ain f ailures that can occur are Magnet Destruction and False Dum p: we 
will hav e a Magnet Destruction (MaDe) if  there is a dangerous loss and the b eam  is 
not extracted. This ev entuality  could cause a down tim e of  around 3 0  day s to 
sub stitute the 2 50  k CHF superconductiv e m agnet with a spare one. Currently , only  1 6 
spare m ain q uadrupole m agnets are f oreseen. 
A False Dum p (FaDu) generation occurs when the sy stem  generates a f alse alarm , 
f ollowed b y  a dum p, ev en if  there were no dangers f or the superconductiv e m agnets. 
This generates on av erage alm ost 3  hours of  downtim e to return to the prev ious b eam  
status. 
T AB L E  1. C a teg or y ta b le u s ed  f or  L H C  c ons eq u enc es  d ef i ni ti on. 
I n j u ry  to  p e rso n n e l  D am ag e  to  e q u i p m e n t C ate g o ry  
C ri te ri a N . f atal i ti e s ( i n d i cati v e )  C H F  L o ss D o w n ti m e  
C a ta s tr o-
phi c  
E v ents  c a pa b le of  r es u lti ng  
i n mu lti ple f a ta li ti es  
≥1 >  5* 10 7 >  6 months  
M a j or  E v ents  c a pa b le of  r es u lti ng  
i n a  f a ta li ty 
0 .1 ( or  1 ov er  10  
a c c i d ents )  
10 6 – 5* 10 7 20  d a ys  to 
6 months  
Sev er e E v ents  w hi c h ma y lea d  to 
s er i ou s ,  b u t not f a ta l,  i nj u r y 
0 .0 1 ( or  1 ov er  10 0  
a c c i d ents )  
10 5 – 10 6 3 to 20  
d a ys  
M i nor  E v ents  w hi c h ma y lea d  to 
mi nor  i nj u r i es  
0 .0 0 1 ( or  1 ov er  10 0 0  
a c c i d ents )  
0  – 10 5 <  3 d a ys  
T AB L E  2.  F r eq u enc y ta b le u s ed  f or  L H C  r i s k  d ef i ni ti on. 
C ate g o ry  D e scri p ti o n  F re q u e n cy  ( p e r y e ar)  
F r eq u ent E v ents  w hi c h a r e v er y li k ely to oc c u r   >  1 
P r ob a b le E v ents  tha t a r e li k ely to oc c u r   10 -1 - 1 
O c c a s i ona l E v ents  w hi c h a r e pos s i b le a nd  ex pec ted  to oc c u r   10 -2 – 10 -1 
R emote E v ents  w hi c h a r e pos s i b le b u t not ex pec ted  to oc c u r   10 -3 – 10 -2 
Impr ob a b le  E v ents  w hi c h a r e u nli k ely to oc c u r   10 -4 – 10 -3 
N eg li g i b le  E v ents  w hi c h a r e ex tr emely u nli k ely to oc c u r  <  10 -4 
Inspirited b y  the IEC 61 50 8-5 annex B  [1 ], LHC expert j udgm ent created the 
conseq uences tab le, the f req uency  tab le and the risk  tab le (tab les 1 -3 ). 
For our scenarios, we will hav e a m aj or conseq uence f or the MaDe occurrence, a 
m inor (or less) f or the FaDu, as shown in tab le 1 . 
The second step is to estim ate the f req uency  of  the ev ent. 
Due to the f act that there is no historical data on m achines that are com parab le f or 
technology , siz e and lum inosity , we hav e to estim ate the order of  m agnitude of  the 
ev ent f req uency . W e can guess, on LEP experience, that we can expect prob ab ly  m ore 
than 1 0  dangerous losses per y ears. W hat’ s m ore, due to the f act that ev ery  dum p 
com ports around 3  hours of  downtim e to com e b ack  to the original conditions, we 
hope to hav e less than 1 0 0 0  dum ps per y ear. Conseq uently , we try  to f ace and ev ent 
that we guess to hav e a f req uency  of  1 0 0 / y . 
 To av oid the Magnet Destruction, we will dev elop a sy stem  that can generate som e 
False Dum ps per y ear, caused b y  its internal f ailures. As already  said, ev ery  dum p 
b rings around 3  hours of  no operational b eam , conseq uently  we will try  to k eep this 
num b er on the order of  3 0  per y ears (1  per week ), so as not to seriously  decrease the 
LHC lum inosity  tim e. 
The f req uency  of  b oth ev ents is “Freq uent”, as show in tab le 2 . 
Now we hav e to decide which approach we want to f ollow. In the standard IEC 
61 50 8-5 Annex A and B , two possib ilities are present: Functional Approach (FA) and 
Malf unction Approach (MA). 
FA is b ased on the def inition of  the S IL lev els and it req uires that the sy stem  has to 
work  with that f ailure rate to b e considered saf e, later it v erif ies that the risk  is 
acceptab le. MA def ines f irst the acceptab le risk  and then tries to reduce it As Low As 
Reasonab ly  Practicab le.  
In b oth philosophies, we hav e to def ine what the m axim um  tolerab le risk  f or our 
ev ents is. For MaDe we can say  that, due to the f act LHC will work  f or 2 0  y ears and 
there will b e 1 6 spares m agnets, we tolerate a m axim um  of  0 .8 MaDe per y ear. For 
FaDu, we hav e already  said that we would pref er to stay  around 3 0  FaDu per y ear so 
as not to deteriorate operational ef f iciency . 
FA and MA giv e us the f ailure prob ab ility  per hour, then we hav e to m ultiply  that 
num b er b y  the operational hour per y ear to hav e the f ailure prob ab ility  per y ears and 
f inally , with the proper f actors, we will hav e our f ailures per y ear. This should b e  
  
  
  
  
  
T AB L E  3.  F a i lu r e r a te ( SIL )  a nd  R i s k  ta b le u s ed  f or  L H C  r i s k  ev a lu a ti on. See tex t f or  d eta i ls . 
C o n se q u e n ce  E v e n t L i k e l i ho o d  
C atastro p hi c M aj o r S e v e re  M i n o r 
F r eq u ent SIL  4 I SIL  3 I SIL  3 I SIL  2 II 
P r ob a b le SIL  3 I SIL  3 I SIL  3 II SIL  2 III 
O c c a s i ona l SIL  3 I SIL  3 II SIL  2 III SIL  1 III 
R emote SIL  3 II SIL  2 II SIL  2  III SIL  1 IV  
Impr ob a b le SIL  3 II SIL  2 III SIL  1 IV  SIL  1 IV  
N eg li g i b le SIL  2 III SIL  1 IV  SIL  1 IV  SIL  1 IV  
T AB L E  4.  P r ob a b i li ty of  a  d a ng er ou s  f a i lu r e per  hou r . 
S I L  P ro babi l i ty  o f  a d an g e ro u s f ai l u re  p e r ho u r 
4 10 -9  <  P r  <  10 -8 
3 10 -8 <  P r  <  10 -7 
2 10 -7 <  P r  <  10 -6 
1 10 -6 <  P r  <  10 -5 
  
  
  
  
  
  
less then the tolerated v alue. In other words 
 y
Tolerated
yhh
Failure MaDeMaDe ≤⋅⋅ 1004000  (1 ) 
 y
Tolerated
yhh
Failure FaDuFaDu ≤⋅4000  (2 ) 
In Eq  (1 ), we m ultiply  the prob ab ility  to hav e a MaDe b y  the expected num b er of  
annual dangerous losses, b ecause we will “throw the dice” 1 0 0  tim es in the y ears. 
For sim plicity , we will dev elop the FaDu concept in the FA and MA. 
In the FA we hav e, f rom  tab le 3 , that a f req uent-m inor conseq uence has to reach 
S IL2  lev el, that m eans, f rom  tab le 4, a f ailure prob ab ility  less than 1 0 -6 / h. S o we hav e 
to design the sy stem  to hav e a f ailure rate, f or the FaDu, which is less then this v alue. 
S ub stituting in Eq  (2 ) the higher lim its, we calculate 4 1 0 -3 f ailures per y ears: prob ab ly  
we are too conserv ativ e if  we com pare it with the tolerated 3 0  f ailures per y ear. Tab le 
3  is also usef ul to estim ate what is the risk  (rom an num b er and tab le 5)if  we don’ t 
reach the suggested S IL lev el with our sy stem . S uppose we design a sy stem  with a 
f ailure prob ab ility  of  1 0 -4 f or FaDu. W ith eq uation 2  we calculate an error Freq uency  
of  4 1 0 -1 f ailures per y ears that, in tab le 2 , is an “occasional” ev ent. W ith tab le 3  we 
read that we hav e to f ace a III risk , which m eans that we are allowed to not im prov e 
the sy stem  only  if  the changing “costs” m ore than the im prov ing. 
In the MA we start assigning the tolerate FaDu per y ear and calculating the Failure 
f igures: with 3 0  FaDu/ y  we hav e 7 .5 1 0 -3 f ailure per hours. Note that entering in tab le 
3  with the 3 0  tolerated FaDu, a f req uent-m inor ev ent, we hav e a II risk . That m eans 
(tab le 5) we hav e to reduce it if  it is possib le and the cost are not disproportionate; as it 
could b e expected, due to the f act that 3 0  is our m axim um  tolerated v alue. 
It has to b e noted that tab le 3  is extracted b y  the suggestion of  [1 ], b ut it could and 
should b e adapted to the dif f erent situations with expert j udgm ent, as well as tab le 1  
and 2 . 
Following the sam e procedure f or the MaDe, we ob tain tab le 6. From  this tab le we 
can see that there is a good agreem ent b etween the two approaches in the MaDe 
predictions, whereas f or FaDu they  are deeply  dif f erent, prob ab ly  b ecause there is an 
ov erestim ation of  the grav ity  of  the ev ent (3  day s of  downtim e is m uch greater than 3  
hours) that b rings the FA to b e too conserv ativ e. 
T AB L E  5  R i s k  ta b le w i th the d ef i ni ti ons  of  the r i s k  ex tr a pola ted  f r om ta b le 3. 
R I S K  D E F I N I T I O N S  
I Intoler a b le 
II Toler a b le i f  r ed u c ti on i s  i mpr a c ti c a b le or  c os t i s  d i s pr opor ti ona te 
III Toler a b le i f  c os t ex c eed  i mpr ov ement 
IV  N eg li g i b le 
T AB L E  6.  F A  a nd  M A  r es u lts  f or  L H C  ma c hi ne pr otec ti on. In bo l d ,  the i npu t pa r a meter s  
 F ai l u re / h T o tal / y  
F A  10 -7 0 .0 4 M a D e M A  2 10 -6 0 .8 
F A  10 -6 4 10 -3 F a D u  M A  7.5 10 -3 30  
L H C S Y S TE M :  M A IN A CTORS  
In the LHC the saf e philosophy  will b e: whenev er there will b e a dangerous proton 
loss, we extract the b eam  f rom  the m achine. The f irst line saf ety  sy stem s are: the 
B eam  Loss Monitors S y stem  (B LMS ), which detects the dangerous loss and inhib its a 
b eam  perm it through the B eam  Interlock  S y stem  (B IS ), so that the LHC B eam  Dum p 
S y stem  (LB DS ) can extract the b eam s f rom  the m achine in a saf e way . This extracts 
the b eam  in f unction of  the b eam  energy  signal giv en b y  the B eam  Energy  Meter 
(B EM). These 4 m ain sy stem s are assisted b y  other second line sy stem s that 
additionally  protect the m achine b ut with slower tim e constants: the f irst line sy stem  
has to act f or 1 0 0 µs intense losses as well f or 1 0 0 s low losses, the second line sy stem s 
react af ter 1 0  m s of  tim e, so they  cannot help f or f ast losses. Currently  there are also 
ideas to extend the B eam  Position Monitor and the lif etim e sy stem  to protect the 
m achine also f or the f ast losses, b ut they  are still not well def ined.  
Nev ertheless, sev eral sy stem s can generate dum ps b ut not exclusiv ely  f or the 
m achine protection aim . From  the operational sy stem s to the saf ety  ones we can hav e 
alm ost 2 0  sy stem s that can req uest f or a dum p, as show in Fig 1 . 
 F I G U R E  1. M a i n L H C  s ys tems  c onnec ted  to the B ea m Inter loc k  Sys tem a nd  tha t c a n g ener a te a  d u mp 
a nd  c la s s i f i c a ti on of  the pr otec ti v e s ys tems . 
If  we assum e that the prev iously  calculated f ailure rate has to b e eq ually  shared 
b etween the dif f erent sy stem s, we should guarantee a f ailure rate, with MA, less than 6 
1 0 -8 f or MaDe and less than 3 .8 1 0 -4 f or FaDu. The eq ual distrib ution of  the f ailure 
rate could b e m ainly  unrealistic f or the FaDu ev ent, due to the f act that som e of  these 
sy stem s, lik e Access, hav e historically  really  high reliab ility . 
B L M S  F OR M A G NE T P ROTE CTION 
As reported in [2 ] and calculated in [3 ], B eam  loss Monitor S y stem  hav e to protect 
the superconducting q uadrupoles against losses of  dif f erent duration and intensity . The 
q uadrupole locations hav e b een chosen b ecause they  are expected to b e m ore loss 
sensib le due to the larger b eam  dim ensions and the lim its in phy sical aperture. 
As show in Fig. 2 , there is also a strong dependence with the energy  and with the 
loss duration, that b rings to a dy nam ics of  9  orders of  m agnitude. Note that the Fig.2   
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F I G U R E  2.  C a lc u la ted  q u enc h lev el f or  L H C  d i pole. 
has b een calculated f or the dipole m agnet. B etter def inition of  the lev els f or the 
q uadrupoles is still on going.  
The B LMS  is m ainly  constituted b y  Ioniz ation Cham b ers (ICs) around the 
q uadrupole m agnets in the LHC tunnel. There will b e 6 ICs per q uadrupole, in 
dif f erent locations, to cov er all the q uadrupole, as calculated in [4].These cham b ers 
send a current, which ranges f rom  1  pA to 1  m A, to a Current to Freq uency  Conv erter 
which digitiz es the current into pulses. These pulses are then counted b y  the digital 
part of  the f ront end electronic. The digital part, hosted in a FPG A, m ultiplex 8 
dif f erent channels and sev eral status b its; it doub les the signal and sends it to the 
surf ace through 2  optical lines. At the surf ace the signals are check ed and com pared, 
to av oid transm ission error, de-m ultiplexed and then com pared with the threshold 
lev els corresponding with the current b eam  energy . The m easured signal, that arriv es 
ev ery  40  µs, is then av eraged to com pare it with the other threshold lev els [5]. 
RE L IA B IL ITY  DA TA  COL L E CTION 
The f ailure rates of  the dif f erent com ponents are calculated using the Military  
Handb ook  2 1 7 F [6]. The general inputs are:  expected am b ient tem perature of  1 0 ° C  
into the tunnel and 3 0 °  at the surf ace, f ixed ground env ironm ent (a f actor of  2  in the 
f ailure rate) f or the tunnel, b enign ground f or the surf ace (f actor 0 .5); the av erage tim e 
to sub stitute a f ailed unit is 1  hours. Then all the usual com ponent f ailure rates are 
ev aluated with the m ilitary  standard. For unusual com ponent we hav e ev aluated the 
f ailure rate using historical data f rom  sim ilar com ponents. For exam ple, f or the 
Ioniz ation Cham b ers we hav e 1 40  LHC lik e cham b ers installed in S PS  which hav e 
b een operational f or 3 0  y ears without changing in the cham b er sensitiv ity . It is a 
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Assum ing F= 0  in Eq  (3 ) and F= 1 , i.e.: 1  f ailure j ust af ter the 3 0 t h  y ear, f or the Eq  (4), 
we hav e f or IC a f ailure rate of  2 .5 1 0 -8/ h. Tab le 7  sum m ariz e som e signif icant f igures. 
 From  the tab le we can see that the lasers are the weak est com ponents: this is the 
reason why  we hav e decided to doub le the optical line, with the im prov em ents 
reported in the colum n “Redundant”. The FPG A f igures, here, are ov erestim ated with 
the MIL standard, experim ental data will sub stitute them . The power supply  is not 
considered here, b ecause there are actions on going f or their f inal lay out def inition. 
In the prev ious tab le is also reported the inspection interv al, this could b e continuous, 
(that m eans an on line m easurem ent of  the f unctionalities), ev ery  operational dum p, 
(roughly  ev ery  2 0  hours), or ev ery  y ear, (IC gas is check ed during ev ery  shout down 
with a radioactiv e source). A f req uent inspection interv al decreases the prob ab ility  to 
f ind the sy stem  not ready  when req uired and so decrease the Magnet Destruction 
prob ab ility . 
ANALYSIS 
The entire sy stem  has b een studied with a com m ercial sof tware (Isograph). A f ault 
tree analy sis has b een perf orm ed, with particular attention to the unav ailab ility  of  the 
sy stem  (the prob ab ility  to f ind the sy stem  not ready  to act), f or the MaDe, and to the 
f ailure rate of  the sy stem  f or the FaDu generation. The unav ailab ility  of  a single 
B LMS  channel, without power supply , is 4.9  1 0 -7/ h and it is giv en f or the 55%  b y  
f ailure of  the IC, m ainly  f or the reason that it is the least check ed com ponent. The 
single channel f ailure rate, on the other hand, is around 2 .4 1 0 -7/ h, 7 0 %  giv en b y  the 
switch sy stem s into the CFC. Considering that we hav e 3 2 0 0  channels in the sy stem , 
we hav e a f ailure rate of  7 .7  1 0 -4. The FaDu num b er is q uite close to the m axim um  
accepted b y  the MA, af ter the LHC sy stem s apportionm ent. In this way  B LMS  
TABLE 7.   Summary of the calculated failure rate. 
F a i l u r e  r a t e  λ [ 1 0 -8 1 / h ]  El e m e n t  S i n g l e  N o t  r e d u n d a n t  R e d u n d a n t  
I n s p e c t i o n  
i n t e r v a l  [ h ]  N o t e s  
I C + cab le+ termin ation s  2.5 20  E x p erien ce SP S 
I n teg rator 2.0  
Sw itch 8 .7  
24 
F P G A  T X *  20 0  
L as er 510  
Dose and 
fluence 
tested 
2 O p tical con n ectors  20    
O p tical fib re 20    
P hotodiode 3.2   
F P G A  R X *  7 0  
8 40  0 .0 14 
Continuous (40 µs) 
  
generates, in 40 0 0  operational hours per y ears, 3  f alse dum ps. W e are try ing to reduce 
this num b er, which is in any  case not so worry ing, b y  im prov ing the switch 
electronics. For the MaDe f urther considerations are req uired. The prev iously  giv en 
f igure is the unav ailab ility  (U1) of  a single channel. For the sy stem , we hav e to 
consider the prob ab ility  that the losses could b e seen b y  j ust 1  or m ore channel. It is in 
f act com m on experience that a single dangerous loss could af f ect m ore than one 
location around the ring and so m ore than one channel that could detect the loss. S o, if  
we def ine Ni to b e the num b er of  losses per y ear that occur in i locations and Ui to b e 
the prob ab ility  to hav e i unav ailab le channels, the sy stem  unav ailab ility  per y ear (Us) 
is: 
 ∑∑ ⋅≈⋅≈⋅= 111 NUNUNUU iiiis  (5) 
In f act, the prob ab ility  that 2  channels (so distant to av oid com m on f ailure causes) 
f ails at the sam e tim e is U1 sq uared, and so on f or m ore channels. In the last step of  Eq  
(5) we neglected the term  higher than U1, due to the f act that U1 is < < 1 . S o the 
q uestion now is: how m any  losses, of  the 1 0 0  initially  f oreseen, are af f ecting j ust one 
channel?  If  we suppose that N1 = 1 0 0 , we will lose in 40 0 0  hours 0 .2  m agnets, the 
m axim um  MaDe per y ears. If  N =  N1 + N 2  =  5+ 9 5 we will decrease Us to the FA 
req uirem ents. To estim ate what the loss distrib ution along the rings is and their 
correlation, a b eam  dy nam ics sim ulation proj ect is req uired and it has already  b een 
lunched. 
C O NC LU SIO NS 
The IEC 61 50 8 standard has b een used as a guideline to estim ate the f ailure rate of  
the B eam  Loss Monitor S y stem . Either f or the m ain f unction f ailure, the Magnet 
Destruction, or the sy stem  induced f ailure, False Dum p, our current design is on the 
b order of  the tolerated risk ; f urther analy sis are req uired to b etter estim ate the LHC 
loss distrib ution and correlation. Im prov ed electronics is also in the process of  b eing 
dev eloped. 
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